PRÁŠILOVÁ, M., SEVEROVÁ, L., KOPECKÁ, L., SVOBODA, R.: Duopoly price competition on markets with agricultural products. Acta univ. agric. et silvic. Mendel. Brun., 2011, LIX, No. 4, pp. 241-250 A situation, in which two fi rms compete, is in the economic theory described by duopoly models. Market equilibrium on the duopoly market is formed in a reciprocal adjustment process of market prices and materialized market opportunities. The goal of the analysis is to fi nd out whether the agricultural products market is signifi cantly infl uenced by appearance of duopolies, what form they have and if they can fundamentally infl uence the price level of food. That food chain stores endeavour to mutually adapt food product prices is generally known; it is set especially by the inelastic demand for the mentioned goods on the side of consumers, i.e., by the need to demand basic food. Duopoly reactions to price competition in food chain stores are particularly strong in the case of commodities of milk and tomatoes, where the reactions and approximation of prices can be clearly seen. Based on statistical research it is obvious that the reactions are most refl ected on sales of the food chain stores Billa and Albert. To identify specifi c reactions of price duopoly at retail chains the ANOVA statistical method was used. The fi rm's duopoly behaviour as such on the food market need not be a subject for applying punishment from the antimonopoly bureau, if it does not have the cartel agreement character. An example can be the identical potato prices inquiry in the supermarkets of food chain stores.
duopoly, price competition, chain stores, ANOVA, Bertrand model, Chamberlin model, Sweezy model Oligopoly can be defi ned as a market model of imperfect competition, for which a small number of fi rms within a sector is characteristic, as well as their high level of mutual dependence when considering their decision making (about prices, quantities, quality etc.). Oligopoly competition thus assumes existence of only a few fi rms in the sector, out of which at least some have a signifi cant market share and can infl uence the product price on the market. When behaving oligopolistically, a supplying company infl uences the market demand and supply of the entire sector and therefore, while deciding on the volume of supply on the market, it has to count -besides the demand -also with the reaction of its competitor to its decision; at the same time it itself reacts to the decisions by its competitors. They include the expected competitors' reaction in the expected demand function.
The goal of the following study is to fi nd out whether the agricultural products market is signifi cantly infl uenced by the appearance of duopolies, what form they have and whether they can fundamentally infl uence the price level of food and thus have an impact on the consumers' demand for food.
MATERIAL AND METHODS
The basic theoretic model of an oligopoly competition behaviour in the conditions of postindustrial society introduced by Samuelson and Nordhaus (2005) is a basis for fi rms oligopoly behaviour investigation for most of the mainstream economists. The development of this theory of oligopoly into concrete market sector conditions is determined especially by Varian's microeconomic analysis of an oligopoly sector (VARIAN, 1992) ; it is particularly focused on the defi nition of a product group. Both the neoclassic (Lipsey and Crystal) and the neo-Keynesian economic theories (Schiller) note not only diff erently defi ned types of collusive oligopoly, oligopoly with a dominant fi rm or duopoly models, but they also underline the need of government control over the oligopoly's market behaviour, even if there are notable diff erences in the particular approaches.
Duopoly models
A situation, where there are two fi rms at the market competing with each other, is in the economic theory described through duopoly models. Now, the decision making process of one fi rm meeting exactly one competitor on a market will be investigated. The relationship of two fi rms at a market can have various appearances, to which the particular duopoly models are connected.
A considerable variety of the oligopoly behaviour allows us to present only some of the simple types of expected reactions of competitors here, expressed by means of reaction functions.
Setting the equilibrium at duopoly market
Each fi rm within an oligopoly has its own function of expected demand, which includes the expected reaction of the buyers to the fi rm's choice as well as the expected competitor's reaction on the market price change and the change of realized quantity of supply. The fi rms maximize profi t according to the imperfect competition condition:
while choosing the quantities of supply, respectively:
while choosing the market price. The market equilibrium at the duopoly market is formed in a process of mutual adaptation of the market prices and materialized market possibilities. This adaptation is based on the fi rm's expectations compared (according to the expected demand functions and expected competitor's reactions) with reality. This confrontation of expectations and reality leads to the expectation adjustment (expected demand function). A mutual correction of the expected fi rm's demand curves proceeds successively until the expectations are equal to reality. As soon as the harmony between expectations and reality is reached, thanks to corrections, the fi rms will be willing -under the same conditions, that is with the given supply function -to maintain the position at the oligopoly market. This state of things can be expressed as equilibrium formation on the duopoly market, which will be seen as certain market price stability as well as the stability of supplied product quantities.
In the case of duopoly, the newly established market equilibrium will be relatively stable according to the sector entering restrictions (in contradiction to the monopolistic competition). If, in the long run, any new fi rms yet enter the sector in an limited number, it will cause the fi rm's market prices to get closer to the fi rm's average costs, without complete reduction of economic profi ts (P > AC), because the accession of the fi rms will be restricted by a necessary capital requirement.
The main methods used for scientifi c investigation are the economic-mathematical modelling method (used for modelling of the maximum profi t of individual duopoly models), the method of description (description of the duopoly behaviour of fi rms), further the historical method, the method of analysis and synthesis and partially other methods.
While elaborating the study, the source was published data from the ÚOHS about the most signifi cant detected and fi ned oligopoly agreements in the years 1990-2008 in the food production sector (Agriculture Information Bulletin, 2008) . For the theoretical part elaboration, the publications of noted American economists, dealing with the issues of oligopoly market structures and market risk were used.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Price competition models in the agricultural products sector
While analyzing the duopoly behaviour of agricultural fi rms on the market in sales competition (Cournot and Stackelberg models) we presume that duopoly fi rms choose the volume of agricultural production (output). The volume of production q then sets the level of market price (P) by using the inverse demand functions knowledge. On the oligopoly markets of agricultural production, the fi rms can o en decide even for a diff erent behaviour. The duopoly fi rms set some fl exible price as a basis from which they derive how much of the agricultural products can be presented on the market. The choice of the basic variable can be considered the main presumption of the agricultural fi rm's behaviour analysis on the duopoly market.
In the following text about price competition on the duopoly agricultural markets it is assumed that, agricultural fi rms set the price and their reactions on a competitor's market price change are investigated. As an example of agricultural production we chose a duopoly competition, where there are two trade cooperatives supplying raw cow milk (homogenous agricultural product) on livestock products market. The largest share on the raw cow milk market holds the Mlecoop trade cooperative, which is a trade association of nine trade cooperatives. The second strongest trade cooperative on the raw cow milk market is the "Mlékařské a hospodářské družstvo Jih" cooperative, associating individual milk producers from south and west Bohemia and Moravia. As a similar example from the fi eld of plant production we can present a potato market in the Czech Republic, where there are also two considerable trade cooperatives producing vegetables -CZ Fruit and Litozel.
Bertrand (Edgeworth) model
The Bertrand model is based on an assumption that in a certain sector (in our case the agricultural production) only two fi rms exist (duopoly). Both of the two fi rms supply a homogenous animal product of raw cow milk and compete with each other on the market; they are equally strong, what is expressed by the same total costs curves (TC). A fi rm in the Bertrand model plans the market price P 1 with the expected volume of output q 1 . It expects that the competitor will not react by the market price P 2 on a change of its market price P 1 . The same behaviour occurs even in its reaction on the competitor's market price change (VARIAN, 1992) .
The expected reactions of the fi rms can be described by the functions: a) P 2 = P 2 (P 1 ) = a constant with zero fi rst derivative
(P 2 does not change with a change of P 1 ) b) P 1 = P 1 (P 2 ), where P 1 = a constant with zero fi rst derivative
(P 1 does not change with a change of P 2 ).
The demand for milk supply from the agricultural fi rms in Bertrand model can be generally expressed by the function:
Then the expected demand function, while choosing the price P 1 by the fi rst fi rm and the competitor's price will be:
Profi t maximizing in Bertrand model
In the Bertrand model the agricultural fi rms are of the same strength; that is set by the same total costs functions TC:
where c represents the marginal costs, q i is the volume of milk production of the i-th fi rm. Duopoly fi rms then maximize the profi ts from milk production according to the function:
The fi rm's competition in Bertrand model proceeds as follows; both of the two agricultural fi rms set together their milk production prices. If the price by the fi rst fi rm is lower than the second fi rm's price, the fi rst fi rm will occupy the whole milk market. Were it to the contrary, the whole market would be occupied by the second fi rm. If both of the two duopoly fi rms decide for a common milk price, each of them gets the exact half of the market demand for milk. This conclusion accrues from the assumption of the same total costs functions in the case of both fi rms. The fi rms reach a stable equilibrium only when they both set the milk price at the level of marginal costs. Because both of the fi rms have the same total costs functions, only one milk market price occurs, and it is equal to the marginal costs. With this milk price, the fi rms reach zero economic profi t. The Bertrand model equilibrium can be expressed by the Fig. 1 .
The reaction curves set the combinations of milk prices P 1 and P 2 , which bring the given fi rm maximum profi t; they have an appearance of a straight line with a positive angle coeffi cient. With the assumption of equal profi t curves and reaction curves knowledge of both of the two agricultural fi rms, it is possible to fi nd out an optimal price level (the price equilibrium of the model).
It is obvious from the graph that, both of the two agricultural fi rms sell their milk production for the same price. One of the assumptions of the model is the homogeneity of production and it is not possible to sell the same production on the same market for diff erent prices. That is why the point E lies on the straight line, which starts from the point of beginning of the axes at an angle of 45˚. 1: Bertrand equilibrium Source: VARIAN, 1992 Duopoly price models with expected reactions from competitors
While analyzing the Bertrand duopoly model we set a simplifying assumption that the agricultural fi rm, while deciding, did not presume its competitor to react anyhow to its production price change (P).
In the following text this assumption is abandoned and it is assumed that, the agricultural fi rm plans to ask market price P 1 while expecting to supply quantity q 1 . It expects the competitor to react to the potato price change. Its reaction to the market price of potatoes will be the same.
The expected reaction of both the two duopoly fi rms can be expressed by the functions: a) P 2 e = P 2 (P 1 ) with the fi rst derivative, not equal to zero ∂P 2   ≠ 0 (9) ∂P 1 (P 2 changes with the change of P 1 ) b) P 1 e = P 1 (P 2 ) with the fi rst derivative, not equal to zero
(P 1 also changes with the change of P 2 ).
The expected demand function can have the form of:
with a revenue function:
In principle we recognize three cases of possible price reactions of fi rms: a) the price change of the second fi rm (P 2 ) can be the same as the price change of the fi rst fi rm (P 1 ) b) Chamberlin model c) Sweezy model (also a model with a kinked demand curve).
The price change of the second fi rm (P 2 ) can be the same as the price change of the fi rst fi rm (P 1 )
The second duopoly fi rm reacts to a potato price growth (decline) P 1 by a growth (decline) of the potato price P 2 .
Then the fi rst fi rm is going to react the same way.
Chamberlin model
The Chamberlin model assumes that the competing fi rms will copy the competitor's potato market prices and place them into their own expected demand functions. One of them can be the price leader and the second fi rm will only passively adapt its potato price choice to the price of the price leader. Then we presume that:
We consider the fi rst fi rm to be in the position of price leader, to have an information advantage and to know the second fi rm's potato supply curve. The fi rst fi rm maximizes its profi t and takes into account a possible reaction of the second fi rm (the follower). The second fi rm copies the potato price, set by the price leader, as given and adapts to it passively.
2: Equilibrium in the price leader model Source: VARIAN, 1992 On the graph we can see the market demand D and the marginal costs of the second fi rm MC, which also show its potato supply curve. The leader (fi rst fi rm) subtracts the marginal costs (supply from the market demand of the second fi rm and thus gets a reduced demand a er its own potato production (D R ). The fi rst fi rm maximizes its profi ts on the basis of marginal revenues equalization, derived from the reduced demand (D R ), with marginal costs (MC).
Since it is assumed the fi rms have the same cost functions, the course of the marginal costs of the fi rst fi rm corresponds to the course of the competitor's (second fi rm) marginal costs. Optimum of the price leader appears in the point E, therefore the fi rst fi rm will supply the production quantity q 1 on the market. The potato price will be derived from the reduced demand: an optimal volume of output thus matches the price P 1 .
The second fi rm (follower) accepts the potato market price set by the leader. With this price, the total of Q T units of production will be sold on the market. Inasmuch as the fi rst fi rm supplies the market with q 1 units of output, the second fi rm gets a market share of:
The price of the production on sale is higher than the fi rm's marginal costs, for which both of the two oligopoly fi rms reach (with an assumption of nonexistent fi xed costs) an economic profi t. According to the larger market share the price leader reaches higher profi ts than the second fi rm in the passive role of follower.
Examples of fi rm's duopoly behaviour in food sector in the Czech Republic
By itself the fi rm's duopoly behaviour at the food market need not be subject to fi nes by the antimonopoly bureau, given it does not have cartel agreement character. The identical potato prices inquiry in the supermarkets of food chain stores can serve an example.
On December 8 th , 2003, ÚOHS (the Offi ce) started an administrative procedure with the companies AHOLD Czech Republic, BILLA, Carrefour ČR, DELVITA, Globus ČR, JULIUS MEINL, Kaufl and ČR, PLUS -DISCOUNT, SPAR Czech trading company and Tesco Stores ČR. Possible breach of the law on protection of economic competition was seen by the Offi ce in an agreement or action in common accord of participants of the procedure when setting the level of selling prices of potatoes for fi nal consumers. When checking the levels of selling prices, the Offi ce -among other facts -also found out that the selling price of the 2 kgs package of potatoes generally ranged between 29.50 CZK and 32 up to 34 CZK, while in the premises of seven participants of the procedure, the same level of selling prices -29.90 CZK per 2 kgs package of potatoes was discovered. A er the assessment of all facts and evidence gained during the course of the administrative procedure, it was not proven by ÚOHS that the setting of selling prices of potatoes by the participants of the conduct and their level were a consequence of breach of the law.
As an opposite example of collusive oligopoly formation in case of two fi rms on the market a trade chains price cartel can be presented. The companies BILLA and Omega Retail (earlier JULIUS MEINL), which together coordinated and adjusted their purchase prices of goods and trading conditions towards their suppliers in years 2001 and 2002, were fi ned to pay 23.80 mil. CZK and 19.55 mil. CZK, respectively. These companies committed a price cartel when they were exchanged information about their purchase prices and bonus and discount systems. They compared this information and from their suppliers, they demanded levelling of their upto-date fi nancial conditions for purchase of goods to the level of another participant of the conduct (if he had them more convenient), moreover they also demanded fi nancial compensations to balance incurred diff erences (Zemědělství, 2008) .
By implemented agreements between themselves, cartel participants can exclude the risk of competition on market when an individual competitor does not have the information about an intended behaviour of his rival. Nevertheless, it is completely natural for competition on the market that competitors are forced to accept even inconvenient off ers, if they want to further act on the market. Neither a continuing inexpedience of participation in economic competition on market does rehabilitate anticompetitive behaviour of subjects that are in the positions of mutual competitors. Such behaviour cannot even be rehabilitated by circumstances that infl uence agro production (for example Avian fl u, increasing prices of energy) and production costs connected with that or by behaviour of other participants of competition on the market. Such common action of mutual competitors must be assessed as anti-competitive, because each participant in the com petition on a market is supposed to act on his own and to carry the risks arising from it.
Of course there is a certain risk of being detected, but we can say "that the risk expresses a situation when the subject decides on the basis of information about the probability distribution of possible outcomes available" (ŠRÉDL, 2010).
Sweezy model (also the model with a kinked demand curve)
While analyzing models of duopolies described so far on examples of agricultureal production, most of the time we started from the assumption that the oligopoly fi rms supply a homogenous production, which they off er for an identical market price.
In the Sweezy model we presume that both of the two fi rms produce a specifi ed product, for example bread (bakery, butter, cheese, etc.) and each fi rm expects that the competitor will not react on its market price increase, but it will react on its lowering by lowering his own price, as well. In the Czech Republic an example of duopoly behaviour can be the competition of two bakery companies: United Bakeries and Penam.
We can see two demand curves D and D' on the graph. The fi rst demand curve (D) comes out of the assumption that the competitor will not follow the price change (P) made by the fi rst duopoly fi rm. The second demand curve (D') is based on the assumption that the competing fi rm will follow the price change made by the fi rst fi rm (KAUSHIK, CASEY, 1982) .
If the existing bread market price level of the fi rst fi rm is P 1A , then while P 1 > P 1A the function of expected demand will have lower slope (higher price elasticity of demand) with the competitors price P 2 = const., because even a little increase of P 1 causes a larger decrease in demanded quantity q 1 because of larger effl ux of buyers.
On the contrary, while lowering the price P 1 < P 1A the demand function for bread will have steeper slope (lower price elasticity), because the competitor will lower price P 2 as a reaction on the lower P 1 , thus the infl ux of the buyers will be lower than their effl ux as in case of P 1 growth. The relation holds:
The result of this competing fi rms behaviour is the kinked demand curve compounded out of two parts: one of its parts (the less elastic one) expresses the competitors reaction on the bread price decline made by the fi rst fi rm, the second part (the more elastic one) expresses the absence of the competitor's reaction on the bread price increase of the fi rst fi rm.
The demand curve kink BAD' lies at the point A. With regard to an unusual shape of the demand curve the marginal revenue curve (MR, MR') is not continuous. Further, we will be interested in what quantity of bread production q the fi rm maximizes its profi t. If we introduce the marginal costs curve MC into the graph, we fi nd out that the equality of marginal revenue (MR) and marginal costs (MC) will never appear no matter what is the bread production quantity (q).
Therefore we consider the output q 1 as an optimal bread production quantity (q); if the fi rm supplied larger bread production than q 1 , the fi rm's revenue growth would be lower than its costs growth and vice versa. The Sweezy duopoly model with kinked demand curve was developed as a consequence of the need to explain the tendencies for sticky (rigid) prices appearance, which occurred at some oligopoly markets, for example the food chain stores, but it does not explain how the prices as such are formed.
Considering the unreal price growth in this oligopoly competition model the food chain stores broaden the supply of agriculture sector products, including the already mentioned bread, which they sell under their own brand.
They expect the demand a er private products, which are cheaper than branded products, to increase. For example the Ahold Company already placed into its Albert shops more than 1 000 of new products sold under the private brand Euro 3: Sweezy model Source: SWEEZY AND BARAN, 1966 Shopper and Albert Quality. In the Tesco stores ČR the private brands take a share of almost 25% of the total food assortment and the number increases of about one third annually.
Just in the recent economic situation an increased demand for private brands can be observed, because they are a good quality-to-price-ratio alternative compared to the branded products. According to the producers the largest demand is for commodity food, thus a er milk, oil, rice and fl our. The largest share of the private brand assortment is in the category of meat, where it reaches 80% of total assortment.
The food chain stores' private goods, according to last year survey, are regularly purchased by more than one half of Czech population; but it is still less than e.g., in Hungary or Slovakia.
Duopoly price model solution on example of food chain stores' commodities
The fi rms duopoly behaviour on the agricultural products market is still a more frequent phenomenon with regard to the desirable production and distribution concentration of plant or animal pro duction in agriculture. The agricultural producers face (by clustering their fi rms into big trade cooperatives) a split between frequent fragmentation of production (also given by landscape sustainable development) and the oligopoly power of supranational food chain stores, which take over a notable part of their production.
The fi rms duopoly behaviour as such, at the agricultural products markets, is not a cause for being subject to fi nes by the ÚOHS, if it does not demonstrably have a character of cartel agreement. On the contrary, of course the fi rm's duopoly behaviour attracts attention of the antimonopoly bureau and frequently leads to a start of inquiry, whether the particular duopoly situation does not have any features of illegal cartel (an example can be the inquiry of almost identical potato prices in food chain store supermarkets).
The food chain stores endeavour to mutually adapt food product prices is generally known; it is set especially by the inelastic demand for the mentioned goods from the consumers, i.e., by the need to demand basic food. An interesting illustration of the mentioned assimilations (duopoly reactions) can be a table expressing the proximity of fi rms supply and equilibrium prices.
As it is seen on the Tab. I, in case of homogenous products (e.g. milk) supplied by the Czech trade cooperatives, the duopoly price competition appears and the market price gets very close to equilibrium price. On the contrary we can present an example (tomatoes) of heterogeneous product, of which the price was infl uenced by the oligopoly space model, where these agricultural products are bought by particular food chain stores in diff erent countries and thereby we can observe diff erent price levels. This can lead to considerable diff erences in the shopping basket prices for the consumers.
A cluster of weekly prices of selected kinds of food from 4 representatives of the chain stores was analyzed using the ANOVA method. A er verifi cation and satisfaction of this method's condi tions, the F-test values were found as well as the p-value (probability) for hypothesis testing of the average price of food between the food chains. Tab. II shows the test results.
In all the cases a signifi cant statistical diff erence was found between the sellers. The question is, between which sellers. The Scheff é test was used and evaluated at a 5% signifi cance level in order to form homogeneous groups of sellers, that are shown in Tab. III.
Duopoly reactions to price competition in food chain stores are particularly strong in the case of 
CONCLUSION
The eff ort to sell the agro-products and maximize profi t even in the hard food chain store competition conditions leads to formation of Sweezy duopoly model in case of heterogeneous agro-production (bread, bakery, cheese etc.) and input costs increase. Here, the private brands have the crucial role of agroproduction, which can grant higher production sales with lower sale prices and constant quality. In the agro-production practice we meet more o en the price competition models than the sales competition models and most of the cases of fi rm's duopoly behaviour has a character of competitor's expected reaction model. It is set by the persistent struggle for survival under the conditions of tough competition environment, which is proved by many fi rms leaving the market as well. Hence, we can see also the impact of nature (crop failure), healthy life style eff orts (bio products), small scale and farmer market preferences (fresh and quality production) and other factors, which modify the fi rms oligopoly behaviour in the agricultural production sector. Consumption is viewed also as a social behaviour. Psychological aspects of the consumer subjects' behaviour are also important (ŠRÉDL, SOUKUP, 2011).
SUMMARY
Oligopoly competition assumes the existence of a few fi rms only in the sector, out of which at least some have a signifi cant market share and can aff ect the product prices on the market. The market equilibrium on the duopoly market is formed in a process of mutual adaptation of the market prices and materialized market possibilities. This adaptation is based on the fi rms expectations compared (according to the expected demand functions and expected competitor's reactions) with reality. The duopoly fi rms set some fl exible price as the basis from which they derive how much of the agricultural production can be presented on the market. The choice of the basis variable can be considered as the main presumption of the agricultural fi rm's behaviour analysis at the duopoly market. A duopoly competition can be chosen as an example, where there are two trade cooperatives producing raw cow milk (a homogenous agricultural product) on the livestock production market. In the Sweezy model we will presume that both of the two fi rms produce a specifi c product, for example bread (bakery, butter, cheese, etc.) and the fi rm expects that the competitor will not react on its market price increase, but it will react on its lowering by lowering his as well. In the Czech Republic an example of duopoly behaviour can be the competition of two bakery companies: United Bakeries and Penam. The Sweezy duopoly model with kinked demand curve was developed as a consequence of the need to explain the tendencies for sticky (rigid) prices appearance, which occurred on some oligopoly markets, for example the food chain stores, but it does not explain how the prices as such are formed. Considering the unreal price growth in this oligopoly competition model the food chain stores broaden the supply of agriculture sector products, including bread, which they sell under their own brand. The food chain stores endeavour to mutually adapt food production prices is generally known; it is set especially by the inelastic demand for the mentioned goods from the side of consumers, i.e. by the need to demand basic food. A cluster of weekly prices of chosen kinds of food from 4 representatives of the chain stores was analyzed using the ANOVA method. A er verifi cation and satisfaction of this method's conditions, the F-test values were found as well as the p-value (probability) for hypothesis testing of the average price of food among the food chains. Based on statistical research it is obvious that the reactions are most refl ected on sales of food chain stores Billa and Albert.
